Political scientists have a mixed record in predicting the political future; and so, as political scientists, we won't engage in expansive 'futurology' and 'guestimates' about the future of Parliament in this chapter. Instead, in exploring the future of parliamentary politics, we will invoke the words often attributed to Albert Einstein: 'The future is an unknown, but a somewhat Collectively, these chapters provide an overarching assessment of the contemporary significance of the UK parliament in the UK's political system by revealing what it 'is' as an institution. Whilst it is not our intention to reprise the analyses of earlier chapters; it is our intention, however, to identify key puzzles implicit within these analyses which raise fundamental questions about what parliament is and why it exists. In turn, this will help us to identify the 'predictable unknowns' as starting points for the exploration of the future.
The 'who ', 'what' and 'how' questions The chapters in Part 4 outlined the contemporary significance of representation in parliament and the changing emphases and tensions observable in answering the 'who', 'what' and how' questions of representation. The 'who' question focuses attention upon the similarity (or otherwise) of social characteristics between represented and their representatives, and has increasingly found an answer in calls to enhance 'descriptive representation'. At the heart of a definition of descriptive representation is the idea of 'shared experiences' whereby representatives are 'in some sense typical of the larger class of persons whom they represent' (Mansbridge 1999:644) . Historically the 'shared experience' of greatest significance in most representative democracies, and certainly in the UK, has been locality. The contemporary significance of geographic location has been visible in voters' preferences for local candidates as well as in constituency activity by their MPs, and in the work patterns of MPs in
Westminster. The impact of geographical differences, and voters' 'shared experiences' associated with those differences, was clearly evident in the responses of MPs to Brexit in Westminster. The 2016 EU referendum, exposed deep geographical divisions between leave and remain supporters in disparate parliamentary constituencies. These geographical differences, and voters' 'shared experiences' associated with those differences, will undoubtedly continue to drive debate in Westminster, and determine the votes of MPs, during the course of the implementation of Brexit. The importance of these 'shared interests', whether conceived in terms of 'forgotten' geographical areas or of 'left behind' social groups, is that demands for parliament to reflect more closely those interests and opinions will be amplified more forcefully in the Brexit and post-Brexit context. In the immediate future, the cross-cutting pressures upon representatives whose personal referendum voting preferences are diametrically opposed to those of the vast majority of their constituents (most notably for Labour MPs) will reveal, dramatically, the complexities of the linkage relationship between the represented and their representatives.
If Brexit has reinserted the claims of the 'left behind' into the normative case for descriptive representation, the claims of women and ethnic minorities -the most forceful claims of the recent past -will continue to dominate demands for parliament to be more like the society from which its members are drawn. Despite the 2017 general election returning the 'most diverse parliament yet' (BBC News 11 June 2017) campaigners for a more socially representative parliament continued to argue that much still remained to be done in the future. ' (2017:34) . Equally, it was in no doubt that parliamentary effectiveness would be enhanced by 'fair representation of many different groups of people, including women, ethnic and religious minorities, lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people, people from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds, disabled people and more ' (2017:34) . But advocacy of 'fair representation' for multiple diverse groups brings with it future problems of 'intersectionality', and how to deal, both conceptually and practically, with the multidimensionality of social group identities (see Severs et al. 2016 , Evans 2016 ).
On the specific issue of ensuring more social diversity within Westminster, political parties have had the primary responsibility in the past and have been charged to 'bear the lion's share of responsibility' in the future (HC 630 2017:34, see chapter 21) . On the more general issue of 'what' is being represented, political parties will also be expected to perform a key future role in the 'representation of ideas'. Indeed, the primary representational focus of political parties in Westminster, both in the past as well as in the present, has been the 'politics of ideas', which assumes a 'shared ideology' or 'same political viewpoint' between represented and representative. However, the simplicities of electoral competition between two dominant class-based parties, and of the internal cohesion within those parties in the Commons, is a thing of the past. As shown in chapter 23, and amplified in political events in the post-Brexit referendum era, internal ideological cohesion within parliamentary parties -and between MPs and wider party members and supporters -has been 'stress-tested' to its further limits by significant and reinforcing ideological fissures. 
Amplifying the voice of the people in the representative process
If representational linkage is likely to be more descriptive and inclusive in the future it is also more likely to be less, or un-, mediated. Whilst they clearly play an instrumental part in representative democracy, parties and representatives' key role as mediators between people and governance has increasingly been questioned. This has happened simultaneously through declining levels of trust in political institutions and the rise of new forms of democracy, namely direct, advocacy and participatory democracy which often sit uneasily alongside representative democracy. Whereas a standard model of representative democracy largely assigns a passive role to voters between elections, increasingly this model has been modified by participatory expectations on the part of the public, whereby citizens seek to be consulted between elections, contribute to setting the political agenda, make their own representations and inputs in the decision-making process, and monitor closely the activities of The tension posed by the inclusion-exclusion paradox of parliamentary democracy has also been a feature of other e-participatory initiatives at Westminster. Inclusionary intent has been apparent in: the crowdsourcing of questions for select committee scrutiny sessions; the experiment with crowdsourcing of questions to be asked at PMQs; more structured econsultation exercises undertaken by parliamentary committees; alongside e-consultation exercises trialled by individual MPs with their constituents; and e-monitoring platforms. Yet, current concerns about the capture of such initiatives -by organised publics (for example professional lobby groups, cyber-groups constituted in social media echo silos) at the expense of unorganised publics and technologically voiceless publics (captured in the term 'digital divide'); by unmediated clicktivism; by hacktivists; and by unaccountable, often secretive, corporations; and by the pedlars of 'fake news' -hold the potential to be magnified in the future as the scope and penetration of digital technologies expand exponentially.
Parliament has, of course, sought to respond to challenges of the ever-changing digital world.
In 2015, the Digital Democracy Commission set a target, that 'by 2020 Parliament should be fully active and digital', which had clear inclusionary intents of enabling the public to contribute to the law-making process, 'to have their say' in House of Commons debates, and of engaging people through 'an issue-based approach'. But the Commission's report was seen 'as the start of a conversation, not the end ' (2015:75) . A key part of this future conversation will reflect the tensions between inclusion and exclusion, between participation (input) and decision-making (output), and between the articulation and promotion of specific, often sectional interests, and the filtering and assessment of those interests against wider collective ideas about the public interest and the national interest. To-date parliament has claimed an exclusive ability to determine and weigh the latter against the former. Yet, this distinctive ability may yet come to be challenged in the future by emerging technologies and algorithms which enable large volumes of citizen-generated text and speech patterns to be summarised, and, on this basis, for the strength of public opinion on key issues to be estimated.
Thinking hard about collective decision making
One of the key puzzles of parliaments identified by Loewenberg (2011:49) is that the 'equal status of each member of a legislature presents a fundamental challenge to its capacity to reach collective decisions'. According to him, the only way to resolve this puzzle is for 6 legislatures to accept 'an implicit hierarchy, which entails delegating authority to committees, party groups and to leaders ' (2011:59) . The chapters in Parts II and III have examined how this delegation works in the contemporary practice of Westminster. What we aim to do here, however, is to project some of the key recent organisational and procedural developments into the future and so identify some of the 'predictable unknowns'.
What is predictable is that, just as with the puzzle of representation, technologically-assisted engagement and inclusion programmes will be a predominant feature of future thinking about law making, scrutiny and accountability processes in Westminster. What is predictable, equally, is that parliamentary decision making processes will continue to be dominated by leadership hierarchies built upon interlocked government and party positions. What is less predictable however, after the 2017 general election, is the extent to which pre-existing parliamentary norms associated with executive dominance -based upon resilient parliamentary majorities -and procedural devices, which despite reforms such as the backbench business committee, had privileged the executive, will be modulated in the near future as a minority government (underpinned by a third party) tests its capacity to secure the passage of it legislative programme through parliament. In these circumstances the Commons and the Lords will remain, to use Mezey's (1979:47) categorisation, 'reactive'. In this reactive position, they will set the parameters of government action through a capacity to modify, delay and deliberate upon such action, but will normally be unable to veto such action (although a 'hung parliament' makes party management more precarious and 'normal' government majorities less certain). Nonetheless, even in the 'normal circumstances' of executive majorities of recent decades, the capacity to modify and exert influence over government policies should not be underestimated. Indeed, even before 2017, there was growing research evidence that parliament's specific impact upon legislative outputs and, more generally, its scrutiny of government activity through the select committee system, had increased in recent decades (see Russell and Cowley 2015; Russell and Gover 2017 ).
Parliament's increased influence reflects both attitudinal change and procedural and organisational change (as examined in the chapters in Parts II and III). The essence of these changes has been to challenge what Thompson (2015:66) Future exploration, to return to the words attributed to Einstein, will prospect the unknown; but, with an understanding of parliament's past and present, this should be an exploration of 'the somewhat predictable unknown'. We wish you an enlightened journey into the parliamentary future.
